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Introduction
In OECD countries, on average more than 30% of government expenditures are decentralized. On the other hand, only 20% of revenues are collected at the sub-national level.
This means that one third of local expenditures need to be …nanced by central grants.
From the literature on decentralization, it appears that this disequilibrium (which we will refer to from here on, as the …scal vertical imbalance) is somehow inherent to multilevel governments: while decentralizing expenditures is considered e¢ cient in …tting local preferences (Tiebout, 1957; Oates, 1972) , decentralizing revenues is generally viewed as dangerous. Tax di¤erentials could lead to a polarization of the economic activity or even to a race to the bottom in taxation (see Zodrow and Mieszowski, 1986 and Wildasin,1989) inducing an underprovision of public goods. In fact, only taxes associated with non-mobile bases may be assigned to sub-national governments.
To some extent, this vertical imbalance fosters …scal indiscipline since it separates spending from revenue responsabilities. Sub-national governments will tend to overspend given that they share the burden of their expenditures with the other entities (the famous common pool problem). It might be argued that one way to tackle the problem is to allow the central government to …x the budget of sub-national governments. Unfortunately, even if this idea is appealing, it turns out to be di¢ cult to implement in practice. Indeed, the central government faces huge incentives to soften the sub-national budget constraint (see Wildasin, 2004; Goodspeed, 2002 and Akai and Sato, 2005 ). An interesting example is given by Wildasin (2004) : if local entities face a "hard budget constraint" (the national government sets the amount given to sub-national ones), but can choose the composition of expenditures, their dominant strategy would be to concentrate all of the expenditures on local public goods that do not generate cross-border externalities. In such a way, there would be an underprovision of the externality generating goods and the central government would be obliged to intervene. This behavior of sub-national governments induces a softening of the budget constraints because they get an additional …nancing of local goods with respect to what was originally planned. Petterson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2003) , using Swedish data, corroborate this idea empirically. 1 Another interesting and complementary argument against a central government setting the budget of sub-national governments is proposed by Weingast et al. (1981) . Their idea is that, even if the subnational budget is …xed at the national level, it is the result of a logrolling procedure (in the 1 For other empirical evidence sustaining this idea, see Borge and Rattso (2003) and Rodden (2003) .
national legislative assembly), where legislators (that have local interests) exchange votes to guarantee that their pork-barrel project can be …nanced. In other words, the (di¤erent) parties anticipate the hard constraint and incorporate all desired expenses into the budget through the legislative process. The result is that the "hard budget constraint", thus imposed by the Parliament, is in fact no di¤erent from a budget constraint that is ‡exible ex-post. Baqir (2002) and Knight (2004) among others, show that this argument is con…rmed empirically.
If we accept that vertical imbalance leads to excessive local expenditures, an interesting question to raise is what happens when the government has reached its maximal tolerable size? 2 Our idea is that there will be a replacement of national (redistributive)
expenditures by local (non-redistributive) ones 3 and this will a¤ect the capacity of the State to redistribute incomes negatively. The intuition is that, in case of vertical imbalance, sub-national entities increase their local public goods spending since they share the burden of the expenditure with the others. Then, if the maximal tolerable size of government is reached, the increase of sub-national expenditures is impossible without sacri…cing other expenditures. In particular, there will be a replacement of national government (redistributive) expenditures by local ones.
To formalize this idea, we present a stylized theoretical model where the national government is exclusively in charge of income redistribution and local entities provide local public goods. What we show is that the introduction of …scal vertical imbalance, induces a substitution of redistributive central spending by non-redistributive local expenditures and, ceteris paribus, a decrease of the reduction in income inequality. We then present empirical evidence, using a high quality dataset based on individual incomes in OECD countries, that supports this prediction.
The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2 we present the model; in section 3, we describe the data and the empirical methodology; in section 4 we present the empirical results and in section 5 we conclude. 2 In line with the idea of maximal tolerable size of government proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) . 3 Even if there are some arguments in favor of local redistribution (see Pauly, 1973; Ashworth et al., 2002) , the common view is that the national government should be in charge of income redistribution (see Oates, 1968 and 1972; Brown and Oates, 1987; Wildasin, 1991; Epple and Romer, 1991; Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998 ) . Note that in practice, most redistribution is decided at the national level.
The Model
We build a stylized model of a two-level government where the upper (national) level is in charge of redistribution and the lower (sub-national) level is in charge of the provision of non-redistributive (pork-barrel) local public goods. 4 The decisions regarding taxing and spending are taken in accordance with the preferences of the median voters 5 : national decisions are taken in function of the national median voter while sub-national decisions are made in function of the sub-national median voters. To isolate the e¤ect that …scal irresponsability has on the redistribution of income, we compare two extreme situations:
…rst, the vertical imbalance case, where only the central government taxes (at a rate V I f ) and the budget of sub-national levels is exclusively guaranteed through grants (G) and second, the vertical balance case, where each level is in charge of raising the ressources necessary to …nance its own expenditures (the national government taxes at a rate
while the sub-national government of region k taxes at a rate k ). Redistribution is ensured through raising proportional taxes and redistributing a lump-sum amount F to all individuals countrywide.
We consider a country composed of K distinct regions indexed by k = 1; :::; K, each of which has a population of size N k . The country's total population is N =
Individuals are assumed to be identical in all dimensions, except for their initial level of income. Let y ik denote the initial level of income of individual i in region k.
National …nancing of sub-national expenditures
As argued in the introduction, to some extent, vertical imbalance leads to the common pool problem. In other words, the national government explicitly or implicitly, accomodates the demands of sub-national levels. For the sake of simplicity, we model this by assuming that the national government accepts all of the …nancial demands of subnational entities (i.e., full accomodation). This assumption could be somewhat relaxed (assuming only partial accomodation) but the model would lead to similar results while becoming unecessarily complicated.
The utility function of individual i in region j is assumed to be of the quasi-linear form w ij = c ij + H(g j ) where c ij is his disposable income (or private consumption of the numeraire), and g j is the per capita supply of the local public good of region j. Function 4 Results do not change if we allow national government to have a greater role than just redistributing income. 5 See Black (1948). Assuming a benevolant dictator leads to the comparable results.
H( ) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave with
where the redistribution cost function C( ) is assumed to be strictly convex. At least two reasons support the introduction of these costs in the model: …rst, income restribution systems (which are particularly di¢ cult to manage) induce bureaucracy costs that must be taken into account. Second, it is a very convenient way to take into account the distortions that redistribution induces on the labor market, without complicating the model unecessarily.
Since the national government is in charge of both redistributive expenditures and the …nancing of sub-national spending on local public goods (through grants), its budget constraint is:
where G j is the grant awarded to the government of region j. Denoting by y the overall average income, (1) boils down to
In the model, each regional median voter chooses the per-capita supply of the local public good of his region. Since the national government follows the demands of subnational entities, each regional median voter also sets the size of the grant. In other words, the grant G j allocated to region j is the sum of the percapita supplies of the local public good in that region (g j ), i.e. P i g j = G j . Combining this and (2) we get
Assuming, in line with Peacock and Wiseman's (1961) concept of maximal tolerable size of government, that global government expenditures cannot increase inde…nitely, a …nal constraint is P
where (2 (0; 1)) represents the maximal share of national income that can be devoted to government spending. 6 This expression can be rewritten as
Note that budget constraint (3) is naturally binding (the median voter is a utility maximizer) while this is not necessarily the case for (4) since it could be that the size of the government is smaller than the maximal level tolerated by society.
The maximization problem of individual i in region j can be written as
The …rst-order conditions yield
and
where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (4).
Turning to the vertical balance case, the allocation of expenditures remains the same as in the previous situation. Nevertheless taxation responsabilities are di¤erent: subnational governments can now levy taxes and do not rely on national government grants to …nance their expenditures, i.e. there is complete …scal responsability.
Self-…nancing of sub-national expenditures
Consistently with the vertical imbalance case, utility is assumed to be quasi-linear and composed of disposable income plus an increasing and strictly concave function of the local public good, i.e. w ij = c ij + H(g j ). For individual i in region j in this …scal setup,
is the national government's proportional tax rate and j s is the regional rate. As previously, F C(F ) denotes the net transfers from the national government to individuals. Since there are no longer any grants, the national government's budget constraint simpli…es to
while the government's budget constraint in region j becomes
where y j is the average income of region j. The global budget constraint (4) remains unchanged. As previously, budget constraints (7) and (8) are binding, while this is not necessarily the case for (4).
The maximization problem of individual i in region j is now
subject to budget contraint (4). The …rst-order conditions of the maximization problem
On the basis of the …rst order conditions (under both stylized scenarii), it is now possible to discuss all possible cases and identify the solutions that are mathematically pertinent.
Discussion
In this section, using the …rst-order conditions, we show that, in case of vertical imbalance and a binding global budget constraint, decentralized entities will ask for a large amount of local public goods and the national government, to ful…ll the request will have to reduce its own expenditures (i.e. there will be a substitution of redistributive expenditures for local public goods). On the other hand, in case of vertical imbalance but a nonbinding constraint, there will be overspending at the sub-national level but the provision of redistributive expenditures will be the same as in the vertical balance case. These results, summarized by Proposition 1, are obtained through three lemmas.
The …rst lemma shows that only some values of the Lagrange multipliers and are mathematically pertinent.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof is by contradiction. Imagine …rst that relaxing the constraint in the balanced case has a higher e¤ect on the optimal utility of individuals than relaxing it in the unbalanced case (i.e. > 0). Given the strict convexity of the cost associated with redistribution and the strict concavity of the utility function associated with the local public good, this necessarily implies that the size of redistribution and the quantity of local public good provided are larger in the balanced than in the non-balanced case.
Moreover, since > 0, the global budget constraint on the size of government is binding in the balanced case while this is not necessarily the case for the unbalanced one. This is in contradiction with the fact that the size of government, under the initial assumption, must be larger in the balanced case. A similar reasoning can be adopted for excluding > 0.
In Lemma 2, we concentrate on the …rst of the two possible cases, i.e. = 0 = and show that in this situation, the provision of local public goods is larger in the unbalanced case than in the balanced case, while redistribution is the same. Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of the proof is the following: we …rst show that the di¤erence of the e¤ect of relaxing the global constraint in the balanced and unbalanced case is bounded.
The lower bound ensures that local expenditures are higher in the unbalanced than in the balanced case. Indeed, since > 0 guarantees that the global constraint with vertical imbalance is binding and 0 implies that the constraint is not necessarily binding with vertical balance, there will be a contradiction if local expenditures are lower in the unbalanced case than in the balanced one. The remainder of the proof is based on comparing the …rst-order conditions for the possible values of and .
The conclusions of our theoretical model are summarized by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 If the global size of the government is not constrained, the provision of local public goods will be larger in case of vertical imbalance than in case of vertical balance; redistributive expenditures will be identical in both cases. On the other hand, if the global size of the government is constrained, there will be a substitution of redistributive expenditures by local public goods.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemmas 1, 2, 3.
As stated in Proposition 1, the model predicts that, ceteris paribus, vertical imbalance reduces the size of redistributive policies if the global constraint is binding. In the two next sections, we will test if this prediction is con…rmed empirically.
Empirical test
To test the model, it is important to rely on data that provide information on how public income, while others, such as a general public subvention for school fees, do. Our idea to tackle the problem is to quantify the reduction of income inequality induced by taxes and redistribution. 7 In such a way, it will be possible to test the in ‡uence of …scal vertical imbalance on the income redistribution attained through …scal policies (and thus test the predictions of the model).
The dependent variable in this study, the reduction in inequality induced by …scal policies, is constructed as follows: …rst, we compute an inequality index on the basis of market price incomes and another one based on net incomes (after government …scal intervention). Then, we calculate the decreasing rate of the index while moving from the former to the latter. To the best of our knowledge, the only high quality dataset that can be used for this purpose, as explained in Roland and Verardi (2006) . 9 The former is chosen for its easy interpretation, the latter because, while providing similar information as the Gini index, it ful…lls all of the necessary conditions to be considered as a good measure of inequality (see Litch…eld, 1999 ). The speci…cation of the regression model is simple and of the following type
where RI it is the rate of reduction of inequality as de…ned above, V I it is a measure of vertical imbalance, Z it is a set of control variables (and thus 2 is a vector of coe¢ cients) and I mit is the level of inequality calculated on market prices. Indices i and t respectively represent the country and the year. I mit is considered among the exogenous variables, to correct for the di¤erent initial levels of income inequality. In such a way, we identify the e¤ect of decentralization on the reduction of inequality from gross to net incomes, independently of the initial level (or in other words, setting all of the countries at the same market price income inequality). The dependent variable is in logarithm in order to work with elasticities. 11 The estimation method is a two-way …xed e¤ect model 12 to control for all time invarying e¤ects (within country) and country invarying e¤ects (within years). The time varying control variables used are those which are generally accepted to explain inequality. The …rst two are GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared, since Kuznets (1955) and Lewis (1954) suggest that there should be an inverted 8 Unfortunately data for control variables are not available for all of them; in our database, we only keep the following 22 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 9 Where y i represents the income of person i, and y represents the average income. 1 0 The Gini index, on the other hand, does not satisfy the decomposability property. 1 1 Note that RI will never be negative. U relation between development and inequality. The third control variable captures the age structure of the population (percentage of people older than 65) considered because Deaton (1997) argues that inequality should increase with the age of the population, the reason being that young people have more similar incomes than older ones (Deaton and Paxson (1994) ). The incorporation in the regression of the fourth control variable (the percentage of people, older than 25, that obtained a higher education diploma) is motivated by Tinbergen (1975) and Li et al. (1998) , who suggest that a higher educational attainment is expected to decrease inequality. Taking into account the degree of openness of the country (measured as the logarithm of the sum of exports and imports in percentage of GDP) is aimed at controlling for the link between trade openness and inequality (as implicitly asserted by Rodrik, 1998) . It is important to note that we only consider periods and countries for which the level of democracy is high (larger than 0, as measured by Jaggers and Marshall, 2000) . Even if the data on income inequality are of a high quality and highly comparable over countries and years, small di¤erences remain between and within countries, but these di¤erences should not a¤ect the results. For example, even if there is a change over time in the survey on which inequalities are calculated in France, Germany and the Netherlands, the de…nitions of the variables remain the same. Some calculations include net income variables only and some data on taxes are incomplete.
To correct for this, we created two dummies identifying each case and included them on the right hand side of the regression. They turn out to be non signi…cative and are thus not included in the …nal regression. To avoid mixing the e¤ect of decentralization and of vertical imbalance we introduce a measure of the degree of decentralization of the State calculated as the percentage of decentralized expenditures with respect to total expenditures. 13 The data we use are taken from the Government Finance Statistics of the International 17 .
In Table 1 , we present the results of the estimations for both inequality indices. The results are striking: if the vertical imbalance increases by 10%, the reduction in inequality induced by government intervention decreases by 2.3 % if we consider the Theil index and 3.6% if we consider the Gini index. 18 Note that the estimated coe¢ cients are not statistically di¤erent from each other. This means that the result is not dependent on the index chosen. The goodness of the …t is high since the within R-squared is around 80%.
The coe¢ cients associated with the control variables are consistent with previous results.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] We tested the sensitivity of the results considering two alternatives: (i) allowing for a di¤erent de…nition of the vertical imbalance (i.e. the ratio of decentralized expenditures over decentralized revenues) and (ii) reweighting the data according to the number of individual incomes available for the calculation of inequality indices. 19 As can be seen in Table 2 , the results remain unchanged with these modi…cations.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 . Given that C( ) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly convex, we have
Since y = 
y .
The constraints on the size of the government in both cases along with
A similar proof shows that > 0 is impossible.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since y =
Hence, from = 0 = , (10) and (6), we have
). Given the assumptions on H( ), this implies that g Robust absolute t statistics in parentheses * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
